Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystems (MPKCs) are often touted as future-proofing against Quantum Computers. In 2009, it was shown that hardware advances do not favor just "traditional" alternatives such as ECC and RSA, but also makes MPKCs faster and keeps them competitive at 80-bit security when properly implemented. These techniques became outdated due to emergence of new instruction sets and higher requirements on security.
Introduction

The Requirements on Post-Quantum Security
Since Shor's algorithm [Sho97] was invented, it is clear that traditional public key cryptography(PKCs) based on discrete logarithm and RSA assumptions are going to be solved in polynomial time once large quantum computers are built. PKCs that retain sufficient security levels when quantum computers have arrived are said to be post-quantum. Such cryptosystems are also sometimes called Postquantum Cryptosystems or PQCs. There are four or five main classes of PQCs one of which comprise Multivariate public-key cryptosystems (MPKCs) [CJL + 16].
MPKCs and its Security
MPKCs are PKCs whose public keys represent multivariate polynomials over a small finite field(GF) K = F q :
P : w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ K n → z = (p 1 (w), . . . , p m (w)) ∈ K m .
Polynomials p 1 , p 2 , . . . have (almost always) been quadratic. In public-key cryptography, we can let P(0) = 0. We need to discuss the security of MPKCs in order to set the parameters needed for the required security level(s). Public key of MPKCs are instances of solving multivariate quadratic equations, or instances. One can break all MPKCs if one is able to efficiently solve MQ problems.
Class MQ(q, n, m) and the MQ Problem
For given q, n, m, the class MQ(q, n, m) consists of all systems of m quadratic polynomials in F q with n variables. To choose a random system S from MQ(q, n, m), we write each polynomial P k (x) as 1≤i≤j≤n a ijk x i x j + 1≤i≤n b ik x i +c k , where every a ijk , b ik , c k is chosen uniformly in F q .
Solving S(x) = b for any MQ system S is then known as the "multivariate quadratic" problem. It is an NP-complete problem [GJ79] . However, it is not easy to base a proof on worst-case hardness. Often the premise used is the hereto unchallenged average-case MQ hardness assumption [BGP06, LLY08] :
Assumption MQ Given any k and prime power q, for parameters n, m satisfying m/n = c + o(1), no probabilistic algorithm in subexponential(n)-time can solve S(x) = b with a non-neglible probability ε > 0, if the systems S are drawn from MQ(q, n, m), and a vector b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b m ) drawn from S(U n ), where U n is the uniform distribution over (F q ) n .
Hardness of generic MQ
The complexity of solving a random instance out of MQ(n, m, q) is estimated using Gröbner basis methods, often XL with sparse matrices [CKPS00, YCBC07] or F5 [Fau02, BFSY05] . We simply use prior estimates for complexity of solving MQ.
Effect of Quantum Computers on MQ signatures
Since we discuss MPKC as post-quantum, we must consider a direct quantum computer attack using Grover's algorithm [Gro96] , which is considered in [WS16] . The summary of this attack is that a system of MQ equations with n-bits of inputs can be solved in 2 n 2 +1 n 3 quantum operating steps ("gates"). Note that this is not usually a problem because a signature scheme usually requires 2b-bit wide hashes for b-bit security, so usually a 128-bit secure digital signature scheme has 256 bits of input anyway. If we assume that a quantum step ("gate") can run at the speed as a CPU cycle (a very very aggressive assumption about quantum computers), solving a quadratic system with 210 bits of input and output takes an equivalent of 2 128 cycles.
Extended Isomorphism of Polynomials (EIP)
Notice MPKCs cannot be random MQ polynomials, because the legitimate user would be equally unable to invert P. Usually the public map of an MPKC have structure in the "bipolar form": P = T • Q • S where T and S are affine,
The field K = F q is often called the base field. The requirement for the quadratic central map Q is that it is easy to "invert" Q but not P. That is, given y ∈ K m , it is easy to compute x such that Q(x) = y. but find a x such that P(x) = y is hard. The structure is hidden away by S and T . Given this, the MPKC may be attacked via what is called structural attacks.
EIP and "Structural Attacks" Given a class C of quadratic maps K n → K m and a quadratic map P : K n → K m , an associated EIP instance means to find S and T such that P = T • Q • S, where Q ∈ C. Defeating a bipolar-form MPKC through solving an EIP is known as a "structural" or Key-Recovery attack.
Note that solving an EIP problem is very ad hoc, depending very much on what Q is like, and again we do not go into the theoretical details but uses known EIP results in this paper.
Non-bipolar MQ and Proofs of Knowledge
There are MQ public-key schemes which are based only on the security of hash functions and the MQ problem only, such as [CHR + 16] (and the older [SSH11] ). These are based on proofs of knowledge rather than the traditional MQ paradigm. The key steps of both the public and secret operations involves only repeated MQ evaluations. The cost is running time and the length of the signature (many kilobytes).
The Implementation of MPKCs
The challenge of Cryptographic Implementations
In practice, a security system can be broken due to its implementation instead of the cryptography, e.g., the cache-timing attack to AES [BM06] . We would like reasonable implementations which retain as much as possible side channel resilience. This means that the secret data should be independent of memory access and table indices. In other words, time constancy is always a basic requirment when processing secret data. We want such implementations for generic 32-bit architectures (many of today's micro-controllers) and for the diverse instruction set in mainstream CPUs.
MPKCs were usually advertised for speed, which still needs to be reviewed according to today's security requirements. In 2009 MPKCs were shown [CCC + 09] to be easily a match for RSA and ECC at the 80-bit security level. It seems the basic security requirements has shifted to 128-bit, which can be seen from the call of new post-quantum cryptographic schemes from NIST [oST16] . We have to see whether MPKC signature schemes still remain viable in the age of 128-bit security.
Revisiting the Implementations of MPKCs
We can partition implementation of MPKCs into smaller components most of which are procedures in basic linear algebra. The efficiency of MPKCs usually relies on the implementations of these components:
• The evaluation of quadratic polynomials is a key component in implementing multivariate cryptography and had been studied in [BBG07,CCC + 09, CHR
+ 16]. In general, these works studied the most efficient instructions in the target platforms for evaluating using the minimum number of instructions.
• Arithmetic in finite fields is a basic topic in computer science and closely related to the implementation of MPKCs for fields up to 512 bits. For these large fields of characteristic 2, the polynomial-multiplication instruction(PCLMULQDQ) is a perfectly fit for the requirements and had been used as primary choice for building field multiplications, e.g., in [PCY
To perform the multiplications for the platform without PCLMULQDQ, some implementations build a multiplication from vector instructions using Karatsuba or similar algorithms, e.g,., in [CCC + 09, PCY + 15]. In 2014, Bernstein and Chou [BC14] presented the multiplications by applying additive FFT [GM10] and bit-slicing when implementing for generic platforms without SIMD instruction sets. Motivated by [BC14] , we present a multiplication for general SIMD platforms using a new additive FFT [LCH14] in this paper.
• The secret maps of some MPKCs are mainly root-finding of high degree univariate polynomials using Berlekamp's algorithm [PCY + 15]. Since the success of signing is dependent on the existence a root in some MPKCs, we can parallelize the signing process with different randomness for increasing the probability of a successful signing. We achieve the parallelization of big GF arithmetic using SIMD in this paper.
• Solving linear equations is also a key component in some MPKC schemes [DS05] . In 2014 [BC14] demonstrated a constant time Gauss eliminations for F 2 . We extend the method to F 16 and F 31 in this paper. The key is to remove branching on zero pivots and instead use conditional move.
Throughout this paper, we will revisit these key components of MPKCs while taking into consideration side-channel resilience and a 128-bit security level.
Backgrounds on MPKC Signatures
Recap of MPKC Signatures
An Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem has a public map P = T • Q • S where T and S are affine,
The field K = F q is often called the base field. The quadratic central map Q (but not P) must by easy to "invert" . The structure of Q is hidden away by S and T and the various MPKCs are characterized by the struction of their Q's. When evaluating the private map, the legitimate user inverts T , Q, and S in that order. It is almost universally accepted that it is difficult to design multivariate encryption schemes. Most such schemes are either already been broken or have much larger sizes than signature schemes. We enumerate the main MPKC signatures considered secure today and modify their parameters for 128-bit security in this section. We will discuss the implementation of these schemes in the later sections.
According to whether Q involves a mapping in a much larger field L ⊃ K, the scheme is called "big" or "small" field respectively. The size of big field L is usually somewhere from 2 64 to 2 512 and multiplications in L are usually the time consuming steps of the secret map in big field schemes. • The segment structure is given by a sequence 0 < v 1 < v 2 < · · · < v u+1 = n. For l = 1, . . . , u + 1, set labels for "vinegar" variables as
Rainbow/TTS
• The central map Q comprises m structurized quadratic equations y = (y v1+1 , . . . , y n ) = (q v1+1 (x), . . . , q n (x)), where
• Note that in every q k , where k ∈ O l , there is no cross-term x i x j where both i and j are in O l . So given all the y i with v l < i ≤ v l+1 , and all the x j with j ≤ v l , we can easily compute x v l +1 , . . . , x v l+1 .
Signatures in Rainbow/TTS
To sign a message, the signer calculate the hash digest z of message and inverts P with the secret key T , S, and Q by
where w is the signature. The key step here is inverting the central map Q. While inverting Q with given y, the signer randomly guesses vinegar variables x = (x 1 , . . . x v1 ) and solve (x v1+1 , . . . , x v1+o1 ) by
. . .
Here (β
) is an evaluation of secret-quadratic equations with secret valuesx and the matrix
denoted by matVO(x), is evaluated as linear forms inx. All x i where i ∈ O l is solved with a linear solver and there are total u linear systems to be solved. The signer may have to repeat the process if any matVO(x) is a singular matrix. Hence, the main computation cost of signing is solving linear equations and computing the matrices matVO(x) from vinegar variablesx.
Parameters of Modern Rainbow/TTS
In current Rainbow/TTS, u is always 2, with parameters (v, o, o), and at b-bit security q o 2 b (rank attacks [YC05] ). The number of variables and equations are (n, m) = (v+2o, 2o). We require 2 
is a large field scheme. We identify L, a degree-n extension of the base field K = F q with (F q ) n via an implicit bijective map
Thus we consider x ∈ F n q . In this view, the central map Q :
which is quadratic in the components of x, because X → X q α is linear in (the components of) x. We need gcd(q n − 1, q α + 1) = 1, so there exists an h such that h · (q α + 1) = 1 + g · (q n − 1) and thus
The signing process
For generating a signature, two modifications are designed in pFLASH for improving the security. The first special feature is that pFLASH is "prefixed" meaning the first π (almost always = 1) components of the input variables w are fixed to be zero. No coefficients relating to them are released with the public key because they are not needed. The other is a "minus" scheme where a = n − m equations are not released. In other words, the user first computes P = T • Q • S with invertible S and T , then remove all coefficients of the first variable (or more, if π > 1), and the last n − m equations to find a P with n − m equations in n − π variables. The secret key still contains the entirety of S and T . To sign, the user finds the (padded) hash z, pad it randomly in the last n−m positions to form z , invert T to get y, compute x = y h , then w = S −1 (x). This is considered to be a valid signature if and only if the initial component(s) are zero, otherwise we repeat the process with different randomness.
The computational cost of pFLASH is mostly in the part of raising Y with different randomness to a power Y h = X. What this involve are repeated squarings, raising to a power of q, and multiplications in the big field. The last is by far the main computational bottleneck.
Parameters of pFLASH
We show the modified the parameters pFLASH from [CSTY15] in Tab. 2. The initial parameters are (F 16 ,62 − 1,40) which is designed for lightweight devices at the 80-bit security in [CSTY15] . We include this parameter set in our implementations because it is still topical. 
The central map of HFEv-
As in other big-field schemes, we identify L, a degree-extension of the base field K with (F q ) and a bijective map φ :
which is quadratic in x and invertible via the Berlekamp algorithm in asymptotic complexity O(d 1.815 log q ) [KS98] with X and Y as elements of F q . Solving HFE via public equations directly is considered to be sub-exponential(O( log d ) for q = 2, quasi-polynomial) [GJS06] . To increase the security, we may add v vinegar variables and define HFEv(F q , d, v) as follows
∈ L are linear and quadratic respectively inx (and thus in x). Now we have a quadratic central map of x = (x 1 , . . . , x +v ) to y. This is efficiently invertible by guessing (x +1 , . . . , x +v ), substitutingx, then solve the resulting equation for x by Berlekamp algorithm. Finally, we can add a minus variation just like in pFLASH, by releasing only − a of the equations. Now we have HFEv-(F q , d, v, a) with n = + v, m = − a.
The Patarin variation and QUARTZ/GUI
QUARTZ is HFEv-(F 2 103 , 129, 4, 3) with (n, m) = (107, 100), yet QUARTZ is a 128-bit signature and uses SHA-1. The key is that in QUARTZ/GUI, the public map is used k times and the result chained together as in Alg. 1-2.
One final important detail about the Patarin variation. The central operation in the signing process of HFEv-is the Berlekamp algorithm, which about e −1 of the time returns "no solution". In QUARTZ/GUI when we take gcd(X q − X, Q(X,x)) at the beginning and the result isn't degree one (exactly one solution), we forego the rest of the process and restart from picking new padding. In QUARTZ this opens the possibility of there being no solutions. Since a + v in GUI is fairly large, the possibility of there being no solutions is negligible.
Algorithm 1 Signature Generation Process of Gui
Require: Gui private key (S, F, T ) message d, repetition factor k Ensure:
Algorithm 2 Signature Verification Process of Gui Require: Gui public key P, message d, repetition factor k, signature σ ∈
h ← SHA-256(h) 6: end for 7: for i = k − 1 to 0 do 8: 
The parameters of GUI
The main results about the security of HFEv-(and hence QUARTZ/GUI) is that the effective rank for MinRank [KS99] is r +a+v, where r = ( log d q −1 +1) is the rank of the HFE polynomial. An upper bound for the degeneration degree of a Gröbner Basis attack against HFEv-systems is given by [DY13] d reg ≤ (q−1)·(r−1+a+v) 2 + 2 q even and r + a odd
+ 2 otherwise , and we need to evaluate the complexity of the F5 algorithm [Fau02] at this degree to be at least 2 b for b-bit design security. Parameters for our 128-bit HFEv-variants are given in Tab. 3. Note that these are both for 256 bit hashes and signatures, repeated 3 times a la QUARTZ/GUI. 
Hidden Medium Field Equations (HmFE) and HmFEv-
HmFEv-where the "m" stands for "medium" is a variant on HFEv-which uses a smaller "big field" but uses more than one hidden equations. The idea of hidden medium field equations, or multivariate HFE, first appeared in [BPS08] .
With k equations and k unknowns we can eliminate the unknowns to reach exactly one equation of degree at most (and usually equal to) 2 k . This elimination process is a Gröbner basis computation and can be pre-scripted. For k = 2 and k = 3, the solution process is relatively simple. For k ≥ 4 it starts to be more work than the eventual univariate equation.
An unmodified HmFE is not secure, just like straight HFE is not secure. The reason is that the rank of HmFE is equation to k, it is susceptible to the same MinRank attacks as HFE. Just like we have HFEv-, we can do HmFEvto combat this problem. The rank is bounded by k(1 + v) + a and is conjectured to be reasonably taken as k + a + v. Here the number of variables and equations are equal to n = k + v, m = k − a. For completeness, the HmFEv central map is, for h = 1 . . . k:
Unlike HFEv-, there is no structure of Patarin variation as in GUI/QUARTZ. We use the parameter of HmFEv-chosen from recent work [PCD + 17] in the Tab. 4. 
Implementation Tools: Useful SIMD instructions
Advanced Vector Extensions 2 (AVX2) instruction set is Intel's new SIMD(single instruction multiple data) instruction set in mainstream processors for manipulating integer commands. In the SIMD instruction set, one register can be treated as a group of 8-bit, 16-bit, 32-bit, or 64-bit data and the instruction effects paralleled on multiple data. The size of group is dependent on the size of the machine register. In contrast to previous 128-bit xmm registers in SSE instruction sets, the size of registers in AVX2 extends to 256-bit ymm registers, which affords us 32-way parallelism for 8-bit data. Beside the common SIMD for arithmetic, logic, or data manupulations, there are some key instructions heavily used in our MQ implementations: PSHUFB in SSE takes a source considered as a lookup table of 16 bytes, (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x 15 ), and does a simultaneous lookup using the other operand register (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y 15 ) as 16 indices, where the result at position i is x yi mod 16 except negative indices result in 0. The AVX2 instruction VPSHUFB performs PSHUFB 2 times in one instruction.
VPMADDUBSW
requires two vectors of 32 8-bit numbers (x 0 , . . . , x 31 ) and (y 0 , . . . , y 31 ) and then computes vector of 16 16-bit words (x 0 y 0 + x 1 y 1 , x 2 y 2 + x 3 y 3 , . . . , x 30 y 30 + x 31 y 31 ). This instruction is very useful for implementing efficient arithmetic in small prime field.
PMULHRSW
performs the multiplication of 16-bit binary fixed point fractions, rounded and signed. This instruction is useful for taking the remainder of 16-bit integers modulo a small prime.
PCLMULQDQ
performs the multiplication of two polynomials of degree 63 over F 2 (F 2 [x]) and result in a degree 127 polynomials over F 2 .
Note that PCLMULQDQ is part of AES instruction set (AES-NI) and is absent in many Intel Core-i3 processors. The other three instructions are available in all Intel-compatible processors manufactured today since a few years ago. Most larger ARMs have a corresponding vector instruction to PSHUFB called TBL. 64-bit ARM has a corresponding instruction to PCLMULQDQ, but 32-bit ARMs don't, and some small 32-bit ARM microprocessors don't have vector instructions at all.
Evaluating of Quadratics and the Public Map
The evaluation of MQ is an important component in MPKC signatures and corresponds to the verification of signature or the public map directly. We don't require constant-time evaluations in the public map since the computation is publicly executable. The evaluation of MQ also appears in the secret map of some MPKC-signature schemes, e.g., generating Eq. 1 in Rainbow. In this case time constancy is required when evaluating MQ.
In this section, we review arithmetic in various GFs underlying the MQ equations and followed by the evaluation of MQ with respect constant-time and non-constant-time cases.
GF Arithmetic in a small field
A Finite field, or Galois Field (GF), is an algebraic structure, a field containing a finite number of elements. It plays an important role in the areas of math and computer science. To perform the arithmetic in GF, the rule of thumb is always choose equivalent native instruction if it is supported on the platform. However, there are only few GFs with the multiplications correspond to native hardware instructions in mainstream CPUs, so the efficient software implementation of GF arithmetic is a topic of great interest in computer engineering.
Small prime field such as F 31
Hardware parallel add and multiply instructions (mostly VPMADDUBSW, see previous section) are used. However another key to efficient F 31 arithmetic is handling reductions modulo 31. Since 31 = 2 5 − 1, a lazy reduction instead of full reduction can be done for F 31 by shift 5 bits right and adding. The aforementioned VPMULHRSW helps carrying out Barrett reduction. Having said that, in general we need to avoid reductions as much as possible and keep the operations as packed as possible.
F 2 and F 4
The F 2 is probable the only GF with fully HW support, which the multiplications and additions correspond to AND and XOR respectively. However, there are usually 32-bit or larger machine words in nowadays CPU instead of one "Bit" for F 2 , the main issue in implementing systems over F 2 is to utilize the full width of the machine word. In the case of F 4 , we believe that the best way to do multiplication is usually to use bit operations. For this, the 2-bits in one F 4 is often stored in separate registers, or "bitsliced". A multiplication costs 4 AND and 1 XOR for un-reduced 3-bits results and 2 more XOR for reducing to 2-bits form of F 4 .
The case of F 16
Use VPSHUFB/TBL for multiplication tables is the general strategy of multiplications in F 16 . While multiply a bunch of a ∈ F 16 stored in a SIMD register with a scalar b ∈ F 16 , we load the table of results of multiplication with b and follow one (V)PSHUFB for the result a · b. However, the address of table is a side-channel leakage which reveals the value of b to a cache-time attack [BM06] .
When time-constancy is needed, the straightforward method is to use again VPSHUFB, but for logarithm and exponential tables, and store in log-form if warranted. That is, we compute a · b = exp(log g a + log g b), and due to the characteristic of (V)PSHUFB, setting log 0 = −42 is sufficient to make this operation time-constant even if we multiply three elements. We shall see a different method below when working on an constant-time MQ evaluation for F 16 .
The case of F 256
The GF of 256 elements occupies exact one byte in storage and have been extensively studied, e.g. [CCC + 09,CCY13], since it is the basic building elements of numerous applications in the area of cryptography. Multiplications in F 256 can be implemented as 2 table lookup instructions in the mainstream Intel SIMD instruction set. However, this is not time-constant.
For time-constant multiplications, we adopt the tower field representation of F 256 which formulating an element in F 256 as degree-1 polynomial over F 16 . The sequence of tower fields from which we build F 256 is the following: In the rest of this paper, we adopt the following correspondence: our basis is (1, e 1 , e 2 , e 1 e 2 , e 3 , e 1 e 3 , e 2 e 3 , e 1 e 2 e 3 ). The element encoded as 0x2 is e 1 , 0x4 is e 2 , 0x8 is e 1 e 2 , 0x10 is e 3 etc., and numbers up to 0xff are their combinations, for example 0x1d = e 3 + e 1 e 2 + e 2 + 1. In this representation, we can build constant-time multiplications over F 256 from the techniques of F 16 . A timeconstant F 256 multiplication costs about 3 F 16 multplications for multiplying 2 degree-1 polynomials over F 16 with the Karatsuba method and one extra table lookup instruction for reducing the degree-2 term.
The evaluation of MQ
Note on lack of special structures in MQ For the evaluation of quadratic equations (which is the public map of MPKCs), there is no real method to reduce the required computations since we expect to be evaluating a set of random-looking equations unless special patterns were designed into the equations (which only happens in certain unusual variant schemes which does not concern us here). Since the amount of required computations is the same across all platforms, the main focus in evaluating MQ is to reduce the required number of cycles via choosing the correct instruction sequences over various platforms to achieve the required computations. Most of the time, this equates to using the fewest instructions.
Matrix-Vector and Scalar-Vector product
Usually a multivariate quadratic system P is stored as a column-major matrix with the columns being all monomials up to degree 2 and the rows being the equations. The evaluation of P can roughly be divided in two parts: the generation of all monomials, and computation of the resulting polynomials for known monomials. Generating the quadratic monomials given the variables requires n · (n + 1)/2 multiplications. The second part requires m · (n + n · n+1 2 ) multiplications to multiply the coefficients of P with the quadratic monomials and almost exactly the same number additions to accumulate results. The second part is clearly more computationally intensive.
The computation proceeds by accumulating the product of a column vector with a prepared monomial as showed in Fig. 1 . This is exactly a matrix-vector production. So we can thus keep all results in the registers in this representation. 
.).
The computational complexity of evaluation is clearly proportional to the number of monomials multiplied with coefficients of polynomials. In general this is equal to the number of coefficients which is 1 2 n · (n + 3) · m multiplication in total. We cannot optimize the computations by the value according to the computed monomials (zero) if they are secret data.
There are 2 alternative methods for dealing with quadratic terms. First is to generate all quadratic monomials and then multiply them to all coefficients. To generate all monomials, we arrange the variables in registers and follow by multiplying them by each variable. We need to shift the results to pack them together. This requires careful handling and is not always straightforward.
The second method generates the quadratic terms through multiplications by variables (twice). In a degree-reverse-lex order for the monomials of polynomial, the quadratic terms is ordered as c 11 x 1 x 1 + (c 12 x 1 + c 22 x 2 )x 2 + (c 13 x 1 + c 23 x 2 + c 33 x 3 )x 3 + · · · . One can accumulate all the linear terms in one parentheses and follows with a multiplication with second variable. There are n · m extra multiplications caused by this method. One can choose the method of calculation of quadratic terms with the value of n and m for a lower cost of computation, except when doing the constant-term evaluation of MQ in F 16 (see below) where one has to choose the second method.
Optimization from the viewpoint of streaming data
The evaluation of P is actually depending on how fast one can accumulate all data of P. No matter what instructions we choose to perform the calculations, the inevitable fact is the we have to load all data of P. The optimization process is how to minimize the number of cycles (usually meaning instructions) between 2 load instructions of coefficients of P. We discuss the various cases of evaluation of MQ according to the underlying GF. The results of our implementations are reported in Tab. 5.
MQ over F 2 and F 4
The main operations in the deepest loop should contain only the accumulation between load instruction of polynomials since AND and XOR are native HW instructions for arithmetic in these field. We have to prepare the input data achieve this situation. For vertical evaluation of MQ, we broadcast every bit of F 2 to the full SIMD register and store them in stack with their order of variable. While accumulating the results, we can load the variables by their corresponding positions and the instructions remained are only on AND and one XOR. In the Tab. 5, we can see the effect of non-constant acceleration came from skipping some coefficients of equations from multiplying 0.
MQ over F 16 and F 256
For truly public-key operations, the multiplications over F 16 can be done by simply (1) loading the multiplication tables(multab) by the value of the multiplier and (2) performing a VPSHUFB for 32 results simultaneously. The multiplications over F 256 can also be performed with the same technique via 2 VPSHUFB instructions since one lookup deals 4 bits. Other tricks are multiplying by two F 16 elements to a vector of F 16 elements with one VPSHUFB since VPSHUFB can actually be seen as 2 independent PSHUFB instructions. This method of multiplication can easily transform to time-constant version by replacing multab to log/exp tables as in Sec. 3.1.3.
However, since the log/exp strategy costs many operations on addition, reduction of sum, and looking up in the exponential table, we should try to use a multab strategy in evaluating MQ (since it costs only one VPSHUFB), in order to increase efficiency, even under the constant-time requirement.
Constant-Time MQ evaluation in F 16
We have to avoid loading multab according to a secret index for preventing cache-time attack. To this, we "generate" the desired multab instead of "load" by secret value. More precisely, suppose we are evaluating P with a vector w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ) ∈ F n 16 , we can have a time-constant evaluation if we already have the multab of w, which is (w 1 · 0x0, . . . , w 1 · 0xf), . . . , (w n · 0x0, . . . , w n · 0xf), in the registers.
1
In other words, we transform the memory access indexed by a secret value to sequential access by the index of variables to prevent revealing of side-channel information.
We show the generation of multab for elements of w in Fig. 2 . To generate the desired multab on-the-fly using the 16x16 multab for F 16 , we first multiply w by 0x0, then 0x1, then the rest of the elements of F 16 . Now we have 16 registers in which are the products of w and all 16 elements of F 16 . By collecting the first bytes, second bytes ... etc. of these, we get our desired new multab.
, . . . A further matrix-transposition-like operation is needed to generate the desired multab, since the initial byte from each register forms our first new table, corresponding to w 1 , the second byte from each register is the table of multiplication by w 2 , etc. The obvious way to do this is by shuffle instructions, but this matrix transposition operation is actually very fast on newer Intel processors simply by moving bytes into memory, due to some hardware-related scattergather magic in the L1 Cache. One desired table cost 16 PSHUFB to generate and we can generate 16 or 32 tables simultaneously according to SIMD environment. The amortized cost for generating one multab is 1 PSHUFB plus some data movements.
As a result, the constant-time evaluation of MQ over F 16 or F 256 is then only slightly lower than the non-constant time version since the extra cost is low, with only n tables to be generated before the evaluation begin. In Tab. 5, we can see only about 5% difference between constant-time and general evaluations.
MQ over F 31
The matrix-like coefficients of P are stored as 8-bit values because we heavily rely on the AVX2 instruction VPMADDUBSW. In one instruction, this computes two 8-bit SIMD multiplications and a 16-bit SIMD addition(see Sec. 2.6). This requires a slight variation on the representation of P described above: we put coefficients in a column major matrix with each 16-bit element corresponding to two adjacent monomials. All these operations are time-constant.
0xF for elements of F 16 , and continuing for larger fields; this is analogous to how the AES field representation of F 2 8 is called 0x11B because its irreducible polynomial is x 8 + x 4 + x 3 + x + 1.
Because VPMADDUBSW takes both a signed and an unsigned operand, one of the matrix and the monomial vector must be stored as signed bytes and one as unsigned bytes. Since 64 · 31 · 15 = 29760 < 2 15 , we can handle two YMM register full of monomials before performing reductions on each individual accumulator. This is different from [CCC + 09] because they were still using SSE2 and PMADDWD, which produces a 32-bit result and makes the bookkeeping easier.
Field elements during computation are expressed as signed 16-bit values. If m = 64, we require 1024 bits of storage for each vector, precisely fitting four 256-bit SIMD (YMM) registers. If m = 32, two registers.
To efficiently compute all polynomials for a given set of monomials, we keep all required data in registers and try to avoid register spilling throughout the computation, as much as possible. 
Main components in the secret map
In this section, we discuss the key components in various MPKC signatures.
Solving Linear Equations
Solving linear equations (1) takes up much of the time in the signing process of Rainbow/TTS as seen in Sec. 2.2.2. In [CCC + 09] this was done using Wiedemann over F 31 and reported to be faster than Gauss Elimination due to not needing to as many reductions modulo 31. However, since there are no reduction issues for the binary GF arithmetic (see Sec. 3.1) and the asymptotic complexity is actually lower for Gauss Eliminations, we decided to implement the constant-time solver with a simpler Gauss Elimination in this paper.
We use constant-time Gauss Elimination in the signing process of Rainbow. Constant-time Gauss Elimination originally presented in [BCS13] for F 2 matrices and we extend the method to other GFs. The problem of eliminations is that the pivot may be zero and one has to swap rows with zero pivots with other rows, which reveals side-channel information. To test pivots against zero and switch rows in constant time, we can use the current pivot as a predicate for conditional moves and switch with every possible row which can possibly con- 
tain non-zero leading terms. This constant-time Gaussian elimination is slower as reported in Tab. 6, but is still an O(n 3 ) operation.
GF Arithmetic -large fields
The arithmetic over big GFs is the most important component in big-field MPKCs. In this section, we discuss the multiplication over F 2 n which is almost equivalent to the multiplication in F 2 [x]. We divide our discussion into to two parts by the existence of PCLMULQDQ in the platform.
Platforms with PCLMULQDQ
In the platform with PCLMULQDQ, the obvious thing to do is use the monomial representation over F 2 to implement F 2 k . When it comes to fields of sizes of cryptographic interest, choosing the representation for the fastest operations depends very much on the underlying hardware for implementation. We show the representations in this paper for PCLMULQDQ in Tab. 7. Table 7 : The field representations for PCLMULQDQ instruction.
The multiplication in large GFs are implemented as polynomial multiplication in F 2 [x] and followed by a reduction, i.e., taking the remainder modulo the polynomial defining the field extension. For the details of multiplying with PCLMULQDQ, the data is split in 64-bit limbs. In general we are working on the polynomial multiplication of 2 to 6 limbs. The multiplication in F 2 [x] was accomplished by recursive 2-or 3-way Karatsuba's multiplication. For reducing the results of polynomial multiplication to its original length, this operation is also accomplished by PCLMULQDQ. We choose the generating polynomial of field with low-degree second term so the polynomials for reduction won't exceed The Constructions of GF and its Multiplication The F 2 k in this paper can also be extended from F 256 . Here are the field extensions we used in this work:
The multiplication of these GF comprise the polynomial multiplications in F 256 [x] and a reduction (modulo the irreducible polynomial defining the field). Since the reduction is performed by some multiplication with constant over F 256 , it can be easily accomplished with the SIMD method described in Sec. 3.1.4. We discuss the polynomial multiplication in F 256 [x] in the following sections. However, it was not easy to build a suitable FFT for GF of characteristic two(F 2 k ), since there is not always an applicable w ∈ F 2 k such that w m = 1 for a large range of m. In 2014, Bernstein and Chou [BC14] showed the additive 2 FFT [GM10] provides an efficient polynomial multiplications in the circumstance of F 2 k .
For better efficiency, we implement a variation of the Gao-Mateer additive FFT, which is a generalization of Gao-Mateer FFT proposed by Lin, Chung, and Han(LCH) [LCH14] , in this paper. Using the LCH's additive FFT, we first carry out a sequence of additions for converting the polynomial to a polynomial basis, presented by Cantor [Can89] , in Θ(n log n log log n) operations (see Fig. 3 ) and 2 Following the terminology of Gao-Mateer, "additive" FFT means the evaluation points are not a multiplicative subgroup generated by w = e 2πi/2 k but in a vector space comprising GF or its subset.
follow up with a Θ(n log n) butterfly network much like the standard FFT (in Fig. 5) . We call the first stage of additions "basis conversion" which corresponds to "bit reversal" exchanges between the coefficients in regular Decimation-inTime and in-place FFT.
Note that the butterfly network in the forward transform typically splits into two smaller butterfly networks, fed with the same input but with different offsets and multipliers, just like multiplicative FFT's. Furthermore, we discover that when using a tower construction in the additive FFT, all the multipliers in the butterflies have regular and simple forms. There are only some small 3 constants in the multipliers and the calculation in a butterfly can be accomplished with less instructions for multiplying these constants. It turns out the general(constanttime) multiplications in F 256 are only performed in the pairwise multiplications (step (2)). Details of the additive FFT can be found in [GM10, LCH14, BC14] Truncated Additive Fourier Transform For multiplying polynomials containing terms is not power of two, we can also use a truncated FFT [Mat11, Har09] for omitting some computations. These previous research focused on the remaining evaluated points which becomes straightforward in the LCH FFT since the butterfly network is quiet regular( see Fig. 6 ).
We simply omit the calculation related to higher degree in the ivsFFT since we can expect the zero values after ivsFFT from the degree of input polynomials. If a portion of the coefficients is zero in the polynomial, then
• it is easy to simplify the FFT by omitting the zero in higher degree of inputs and the outputs related to "larger" evaluated points;
• also easy to simplify (cf. Fig. 3 ) the basis conversion stage, which only involves adding from higher degree to lower degree coefficients, both going forwards and backwards;
• and not very obvious but still true that the inverse butterflies can be simplified, knowing that a portion (in Fig. 6 -8 exactly one quarter) of the polynomial coefficients are zero.
This turns out to be the case due to the multipliers in the final butterfly stages of the ivsFFT being particularly simple. We extend the method in Fig. 8 to polynomials of 96 terms for implementing F 2 384 which is represented as
The details of truncated ivsFFT are similar to Fig. 8 since we omit exactly one quarter of original ivsFFT results in both case. Aside from completely omitting the computations of the last-quarter coefficients, we still have to specialize the last two layers of butterflies. (Since there are no interaction between fourthquarter coefficients and others before last two layers of butterflies, only two layers have to be specialized.) 
We would then use a Karatsuba algorithm with 3 terms in the pointMul stage for multiplications in F 256 3 , which cost 6 multiplications over F 256 for one multiplication over F 2 24 . Note that the multiplications in this stage is constanttime multiplications(see Sec. 3.1.4) which cost higher than general multiplications in FFT and ivsFFT stages. In both representation, the hight of FFT are 96 over F 256 . There are log 32 = 5 layers butterflies in F 2 24 FFT but log 96 = 7 layers in F 256 . The detailed cost of these 2 representations can be found in Tab Although the multiplications cost similarly for these different representations, the difference in arithmetic are also effected by the construction of GF and discussed in Sec. 4.2.3.
Benchmarks on GF multiplications We shows the benchmarks of our implementations on GF multiplications over various instruction set in Tab. 9. Besides PCLMULQDQ, all GFs are represented as F 256 [x] and implemented in the SIMD style which many copies of GF multiplications are performed simultaneously. The multiplications over F 256 are implemented with SSE instructions as in Sec. 3.1. We also use bit-slice implementations as in [BC14] for platforms without SIMD instructions. For comparing the effect of FFT-related multiplications, we also list the results for F 256 16 implemented by school-book multiplications.
The results show PCLMULQDQ outperform all other implementations. For example, in the case of F 2 384 , the amortized cost of SSE-FFT implementations are 5.4 times slower than PCLMULQDQ version. The results also showed there was a huge gap between FFT and school book implementations. ). We express raising to any given power by as a sequence of squares, multiplies and linear maps interleaved, depending on benchmarking results.
Conversion between field representations
We require a method of changing field representations for the compatibility between different field representations. The change of field representation is simply done as multiplying a pre-defined matrix with the data treated as a vector. The matrix product can be computed by the famous method of four Russians [AH74] . However, while multiplying with secret values, this requires a constant-time multiplication which is often done with conditional move instruction. In this work, we broadcast single bit to full register and followed by AND and XOR for accumulation when working in SSE or AVX instruction set.
The Implementations and Benchmarks
In this section, we give comparisons of benchmarks among various signing schemes, including different MPKCs and some widely used schemes (though not post-quantum ones). Almost all the schemes in the comparisons are parametered at a 128-bit security level, besides the RSA-2048 is in the 112-bit security level. Tab. 10 lists the specific parameters for all schemes under comparisons. 
Alternative implementations for big-field MPKCs
For big-field MPKCs in the platforms without PCLMULQDQ, we show the benchmarks of our implementation in Tab. 12. The biggest difference between Tab. 11 and Tab. 12 is in the signing process. The arithmetic over big fields are accomplished by additive FFT, described in Sec. 4.2.2, in Tab. 12. The other restriction is that we have only 128-bit registers in SSE platforms in Tab. 12 but 256-bit AVX registers in Tab. 11. 
Summary
We analyze the main components of MPKC signatures including evaluating MQ equations, multiplications over big finite fields, and solving linear equations. We present techniques for implementing these main components in x86 platforms using AVX2 instructions with side-channel resilience. Beside reviewing MPKC signatures at 128-bit security level, we demonstrate the following techniques for implementing underlying components of signatures.
1. We use SIMD table lookup and log/exp tables for preventing cache-time attacks.
2. For the private evaluation of MQ over F 16 and F 256 , we generate instead of load the multiplication table with the value of multiplier and thus obtain a constant-time evaluation of MQ nearly as fast as a public evaluation.
3. We demonstrate how to evaluate multiplications in F 2 m where m is not a power of two, for example F 2 384 , using FFT techniques. The main ideas include building a tower field from an unusual base such as 2 24 , or a truncated FFT algorithm. The FFT techniques accelerates the multiplications in big GF for the platforms without instructions to multiply large binary polynomials (PCLMULQDQ).
